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# Pentagon Predicts Big War If Latins Sign Peace Accord

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WASHINGTON, May 19 — The Reagan Administration is divided over whether a Central American peace treaty being put together by a number of Latin American nations can be salvaged as an instrument acceptable to the United States, according to Administration officials.

The split emerged as a new Pentagon study was circulated here. The report warns that the treaty being negotiated by the so-called Contadora group countries would essentially grant Nicaragua a license to cheat. Eventually, the study says, the United States would have no alternative save large-scale military intervention.

The report, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, was making the rounds today on Capitol Hill.

The report became known as Contadora officials meeting in Panama said Nicaragua had rejected a proposal to include arms controls in the peace treaty, saying the provision would hinder its war against United States-backed insurgents.

The Nicaraguan refusal brought to a standstill efforts by the Contadora nations — Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama — to end four years of fighting in Nicaragua between the Sandinista Government and the rebels, known as contras.

Latin American leaders had said the treaty could be ready for final signature on June 6.

The treaty as it stands would set limits on the military forces of all Central American countries, bar outside military advisers and seek to promote democracy in the area.

The Pentagon report says the current draft contains stipulations that would make it extremely difficult to deal with Nicaraguan violations, which it considers likely. After several years, the report asserts, the only way to stop Nicaragua would be with 100,000 United States Army troops plus substantial naval and air power at a first-year cost of perhaps \$9.1 billion.

The Administration officials said that the Pentagon, William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council staff were all to varying degrees dubious about the draft treaty.

The State Department, the officials said, is split between Philip C. Habib, the President's special envoy for Central America, who feels the draft treaty is workable with a number of important changes, and Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who leans toward the Pentagon position.

## Sandinista Strategem Feared

President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Administration officials said, have not yet made up their minds.

A number of officials expressed the fear that signing the accord or the appearance of Administration opposition to the peace process could once again derail the Administration's efforts to provide \$100 million in military and economic aid to the anti-Sandinista rebels.

The main concern expressed by the Nicaraguan Government is that the treaty would "disarm" Nicaragua while the United States and the contras remained free to continue the conflict.

But there is a growing feeling in the Administration that this could be a strategem designed to lower Washington's guard. The fear is that the Sandinistas will approve the treaty at the last moment, leaving the United States alone in opposition.

The United States would not, in any event, sign the treaty, but Mr. Habib has said the Administration would abide by its terms. The signers would be Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

Representative Michael D. Barnes, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, said he had not seen the Pentagon report, which was sent to a few member of Congress today. But the Maryland Democrat said, "I would hope the United States wouldn't put itself in a position once again of isolating itself from the rest of the hemisphere in lobbying against the treaty."

The official Administration position is that the United States will support the treaty only if it guarantees the principles of "verifiability, comprehensiveness and simultaneity." Officials translate these to mean strict enforcement procedures, guarantees of democracy in Nicaragua and the carrying out of all steps at the same time.

But the dispute within the Administration is how determinedly and how specifically to demand inclusion of each of these principles in the details of the treaty.

## Democracy Called the Essence

Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Iklé, who headed the Pentagon study, said that "in essence, the analysis demonstrates the overriding importance of the President's insistence of including democratization of Nicaragua as one of our objectives" in the treaty.

Mr. Iklé and others want this to mean political practices in Nicaragua that would allow the contras to compete for and share power and significantly undermine Sandinista control of the country. Others, such as Mr. Habib, are willing to settle for less.

The Pentagon report assumes that if the Sandinistas stay in charge and agreement along the lines of the current draft treaty is reached, Nicaragua will cheat, monitoring of the pact will be difficult and international bodies designed to insure compliance will do nothing about it.

"In short," the report says, "the Sandinistas likely would conclude that a Contadora-like peace accord would provide them the shield from behind which they could continue their use of subversive aggression to impose Communist regimes throughout Central America."

In an interview, Mr. Iklé said that the "purpose of the report is to explain the military difficulties of a containment policy that would rely initially on an agreement along the lines currently being negotiated."

## 'Past Experience' Cited

To this end, the report focuses on the draft treaty's provisions for setting up two international bodies to insure compliance. Since the draft states that the Central American parties must agree on the makeup of the bodies, the report says, "Nicaragua will insist that one or more of its own candidates be placed on each body."

The report says that the problems would be compounded if these bodies were to operate on the principle of unanimity.

"As our past experience with the Korean and Indochina agreements shows, the presence of Communist states on so-called neutral nation and international supervisory commissions makes it virtually impossible for such bodies to monitor effectively, investigate, and document violations."

This is a reference to the international control commissions set up to police the 1954 Indochina accords and the Korean armistice in 1953. Past American administrations expressed considerable unhappiness because Communist and neutral nations prevented the commissions from taking any action against violations.

The Pentagon report says the draft treaty would also reduce American intelligence collection in the area "materially." Moreover, it says, the Sandinistas would "calculate that the consequences of noncompliance would be mitigated by the reluctance of many signatories to see the Contadora treaty abrogated entirely."

In other words, as Mr. Iklé maintained, recent history indicates that if the Sandinistas violated the pact piecemeal other nations would not do much about it.

That, according to the report, would leave the United States in the position some years hence of doing nothing or deciding to make a "major commitment" of forces.